A bit-error-rate (BER)-based physical layer security approach is proposed for the finite blocklengths. For secure communication in the sense of high BER, the informationtheoretic strong converse is combined with cryptographic error amplification achieved by the substitution permutation networks based on the confusion and diffusion. For the discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), an analytical framework is provided showing the tradeoffs among the finite blocklength, the maximum/minimum possible transmission rates, and the BER requirements for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. In addition, the security gap is analytically studied for the Gaussian channels and the concept is extended to other DMCs including the binary symmetric channels and binary erasure channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
S ECURITY is a critical issue in communications [1] , which has been traditionally addressed at a higher layer by cryptography. As a fundamentally different approach, the physical layer security, particularly information theoretic security, has received a lot of attention. The information-theoretic security is based on the pioneering work of [2] , where the channel from the transmitter (Alice) to the eavesdropper (Eve) was assumed to be a degraded version of the channel from Alice to the legitimate receiver (Bob), namely the degraded wiretap channel. For this channel, Wyner derived the capacity-equivocation region. Later, this work was extended to the non-degraded case, where the eavesdropper's channel is not necessarily a degraded version of the legitimate user's channel [3] , and also applied to Gaussian channels [4] . Recently, the information theoretic security and/or the physical layer security have regained much interest for secure wireless communications.
In vast majority of the works on physical layer security, the security metric is defined based on the mutual information Manuscript Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCOMM. 2016.2591530 (rate) between Alice and Eve. Specifically, two security notions have been extensively studied: the weak secrecy [2] and strong secrecy. The weak secrecy requires that the mutual information rate, i.e., the mutual information divided by the blocklength (or codelength), approaches zero when the blocklength goes to infinity. On the other hand, the strong secrecy requires that the mutual information itself approaches zero when the blocklength goes to infinity. Many researchers have designed codes providing the weak or strong secrecy [5] - [10] .
Most of the works have been devoted to the weak secrecy, based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [5] , [6] or polar codes [7] (also, see the references in [10] ). Because designing codes to achieve the strong secrecy is generally much more difficult, the works for the strong secrecy were generally limited to simplistic scenarios such as noiseless Bob's channel [7] , [8] or binary symmetric channels [9] . However, it has been argued that the weak secrecy might be a too weak security condition [11] , [12] , and in fact, one can easily construct examples of codes achieving the weak security that are never secure [10] . A problem of those codes in [5] - [10] is that they might not be directly applicable to continuous channels, such as additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) or fading channels. Recently, some practical coding schemes based on LDPC codes have been studied for AWGN channels, where the security measure is the mutual information rate (or, the equivocation rate) for the weak secrecy. In the works, the equivocation rate at Eve can be close to the source entropy rate [13] - [15] . With finite codelengths, however, it is not possible to make the equivocation rate the same as the source entropy rate. Other than the mutual information, the block error probability (or the decoding error probability of codewords) might be considered as a security measure. When the transmission rate is above the channel capacity, by the strong converse [16] , the block error probability approaches one as the blocklength tends to infinity. Given a security condition in terms of the block error probability, for a Gaussian wiretap channel, the authors of [17] studied the asymptotic transmission rate and the rate for finite blocklengths using a rate approximation expression [18, Th. 54] for AWGN channels. In [19] , a coset lattice code was designed to ensure the high block error probability at Eve and the low block error probability at Bob. However, a limit of the approach based on the block error probability only is that the high block error probability does not necessarily mean secure communication. This is because 0090-6778 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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a block error event simply means that there is at least one bit error within a block (or codeword). As an example, if there is always only one bit error in a block, the block error probability is one. However, all the remaining bits except the particular single bit can be decoded by Eve, which is certainly not secure. Arguably, a practically effective and useful security measure in the physical layer security might be the bit error rate (BER). If it is possible to ensure that Eve's BER is (very close to) 0.5 with no correlation, she essentially cannot recover any information bits transmitted by Alice. In [20] , for AWGN channels, punctured LDPC codes were designed to ensure a high BER at Eve. The analysis was limited to the asymptotic case of LDPC codes and Eve's BER is evaluated only by simulations, from which it is not easy to obtain any theoretical insights. In [21] , to induce a high BER at Eve for AWGN channels, Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocuenghem (BCH) codes and LDPC codes are combined with scrambling/descrambling. The BER analysis of BCH codes was based on an approximate BER equation of [22] under the assumption of bounded-distance decoding with hard decision, and the study on LDPC codes was purely based on simulations.
In this paper, we also adopt the BER as the security measure for Eve. Using the Gallager's random coding exponent and Arimoto's strong converse over general discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), we first ensure that Bob's block error probability tends to zero and Eve's block error probability tends to one. To amplify the errors such that Eve's BER is close to 0.5 with no correlation, we then utilize the substitution permutation networks (SPNs). Given the BER requirements for Bob and Eve, for finite blocklengths, we analyze the maximum and minimum possible transmission rates. Also, the security gap is defined and analyzed for AWGN channels and then the concept is extended to other DMCs. The summary of our contributions is as follows:
• Because only ensuring the high block error probability is never secure, we select the BER as the security measure. Even ensuring the high BER (e.g., 0.5) may still not be secure enough. To strengthen the security, the high order/high degree strict avalanche criteria (SAC) and the bit independence criterion (BIC) are satisfied by using the SPNs, which have not been adopted for the physical layer security in the literature. • We combine the SPNs with Gallager's random coding exponent and Arimoto's strong converse for the physical layer security. Using the Arimoto's strong converse gives us very helpful insights into the BER at Eve. Furthermore, we analytically derive the closed-form expression of lower bounds of the BER, which has not been reported in the literature. • We show that the equi-probable distribution is the distribution minimizing the error exponent of Arimoto's strong converse for the symmetric DMCs and binary input (BI)-AWGN channels. Our result can be considered as an extension of the well-known result (i.e., the optimum distribution maximizing Gallager's error exponent is the equi-probable distribution for symmetric DMCs and BI-AWGN channels) to the case of Arimoto's strong converse.
• We pr opose and analyze the new and very useful concept of the "rate margins" for finite codelengths. Bob's rate margin is the difference between his channel capacity and his maximum allowed rate to satisfy his BER requirement (i.e., the reliability condition) for a given finite codelength. In the same way, Eve's rate margin is defined, given her BER requirement (i.e., the security condition). The rate margin is useful to optimally or efficiently determine the actual transmission rate subject to the reliability and security conditions. We also get a useful insight into the rate margin. • We mathematically analyze the ultimate limit of security gaps for AWGN channels. In the literature, the security gap was mostly studied by simulations for particular codes. However, it is unclear how much security gap is actually good for the given codelength, for the given reliability/security conditions, and for the given transmission rate. This question can be answered by our security gap result, which can be used as the benchmark for any numerically obtained security gaps for any particular error correction codes for any finite codelengths for any reliability/security conditions for any transmission rates. • We extend the concept of security gap from the BI-AWGN channels to the equi-probable M-ary input AWGN channels, which has not been reported in the literature. • We extend the concept of security gap from the BI-AWGN channels to the DMCs such as binary erasure channels (BECs) and binary symmetric channels (BSCs). Studying the security gap for the DMCs is essential to gaining more fundamental understanding of the security gap. We provide the analytical framework to determine the security gap to BECs and BSCs (rather than simply running simulations).
A practical benefit of the BER-based physical layer security is particularly evident when both Bob's and Eve's channels are good and the channel quality difference is small:
where C b is Bob's capacity and C e is Eve's capacity. If the weak secrecy or strong secrecy constraint is imposed, the transmission rate is bounded by the secrecy capacity given by C b − C e 1 for the channels such as symmetric degraded wiretap channels [23] or Gaussian channels [4] . On the other hand, if the high BER condition is imposed as a security constraint and our approach is taken, the transmission rate can go up to C b 1. 1 Another benefit of the proposed approach is that, for finite blocklengths, we can ensure a high target BER requirement for Eve, whereas for the weak/strong secrecy, it is not entirely clear how to ensure a particular security requirement with finite blocklengths.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, Gallager's random coding exponent and the strong converse 1 Note that this benefit in terms of the transmission rate can be still achieved if the high block error probability is adopted as the security measure as in [17] , because using Arimoto's strong converse can be used for the high block error probability as in [17] or for the high BER as in our work. Therefore, the aspect of using Arimoto's strong converse in our work is the same as in [17] . However, a critical difference is that we aim at the high BER, not the high block error probability as in [17] . are used to derive Bob's block error probability upper bound and Eve's block error probability lower bound. Also, it is demonstrated that the errors can be effectively amplified by SPNs. In Section III, we first combine the strong converse and the SPNs. Then the maximum/minimum rates and security gaps are analyzed given finite blocklengths and the BER requirements for Bob and Eve. In Section IV, some numerical results are presented and the paper is concluded in Section V.
Notation: We use A := B to denote that A, by definition, is equal to B, and we use A =: B to denote that B, by definition, is equal to A. Also, CN (0, σ 2 ) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with variance σ 2 (or variance σ 2 /2 per dimension).
II. GALLAGER FUNCTION, STRONG CONVERSE,
AND ERROR AMPLIFICATION Assume that a message M represented by K bits is transmitted by Alice. Using a code composed of 2 K codewords, the message is encoded into a codeword X n of n symbols. The transmission rate R is given by R = K ln 2 n (nats/channel use). Bob's received codeword is denoted by Y n b and Eve's received codeword is denoted by Y n e . Assuming both channels are DMCs, they are described by the conditional probability distributions f Y b |X (y b |x) and f Y e |X (y e |x), respectively, for Bob and Eve. LetM b andM e denote the decoded messages at Bob and Eve, respectively. Let C b and C e denote the channel capacities for Bob and Eve, respectively.
A. Bob's Block Error Probability Based on Gallager Function
Let C denote a code whose symbols X are randomly generated by input distribution q X (x), which is simply denoted by q(x) whenever there is no ambiguity. Let P b err (R|C ) = Pr(M =M b |C ) denote the decoding error probability of code C at Bob. Let P b err (R) denote the average probability over the ensemble of all codes at Bob. The ensemble average block error probability P b err (R) at Bob can be upper bounded as follows [24, Th. 5.6.2]:
is valid for any 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and for any distribution q(x), the bound can be tightened by optimizing ρ and q(x) as follows:
The optimal distribution q(x) and the optimal ρ are denoted as follows:
When R < C b , there exists at least one code of which block error probability upper bound tends exponentially to zero as n → ∞. With the optimal distribution yielding the tightest upper bound, the asymptotic slope of E b 0 (ρ, q(x)) when ρ approaches zero is the capacity of Bob's channel [24, Sec. 5.6] :
B. Eve's Block Error Probability Based on Arimoto's Strong Converse
Let P e err (R|C ) = Pr(M =M e |C ) denote the block error probability of code C at Eve. We first define P e,L err (R, ρ , q (x)) as follows
, and ρ replaced by q (x), f Y e |x (y e |x), and ρ , respectively. When R > C e and a priori probabilities are equal, Eve's block error probability P e err (R|C ) of any code C is lower bounded by [16] , [25, eq. (3.9.21)]: P e err (R|C ) ≥ P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)), ∀C whereq ρ (x) is given by
Note that, unlike the case of upper bound, the single-letter expression (4) of the lower bound is obtained with the particular input distributionq ρ (x). 2 Since P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)) is still valid for any −1 < ρ ≤ 0, the tightest bound can be obtained by optimizing ρ as follows:
When R > C e and a priori probabilities are equal, therefore, the error probability lower bound of any code tends exponentially to one as n → ∞. With the particular distribution q (x) yielding the valid lower bound for any code, the asymptotic 2 Compared to the upper bound tightened byq ρ (x), the lower bound determined byq ρ (x) might be considered to be weaker or less tight becausȇ q ρ (x) is obtained by minimizing E e 0 (ρ , q(x)) rather than maximizing it. In return, the obtained lower bound is valid for all possible codes (rather than some codes in the ensemble as in the upper bound case).
slope of E e 0 (ρ , q (x)) when ρ approaches zero is the capacity of Eve's channel [16] :
.
C. Confusion and Diffusion: Error Amplification by the SPN in Cryptography
In the cryptography, error amplification has been extensively studied for the hash functions and block ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [26] . The most common approach is to use the substitution-boxes (S-boxes), which are designed based on several criterions. In particular, the avalanche property plays a very important role. This property was first introduced by Feistel [27] ; but, the fundamental concept was actually based on Shannon's confusion [1] . In [28] , the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) was defined as follows: the SAC is satisfied if, whenever a single input bit is complemented, each of all output bits changes with a 50% probability. In general, it is very difficult to design the large-size S-boxes satisfying the SAC. In today's practical cryptographic systems, therefore, the small-size S-boxes are often used; for example, 8×8 S-boxes are used for the AES. In order to handle a larger number of input bits at the same time, the SPNs are often used. An SPN is composed of multiple parallel-connected S-boxes taking multiple input bits. The output bits from those S-boxes are permutated by a permutation box (P-box). Typically, an SPN is designed by implementing several rounds of alternating S-boxes and P-boxes. In fact, the design of alternating S-boxes and P-boxes is based on Shannon's two fundamental security concepts: confusion and diffusion [1] . In the SPNs used for cryptographic applications, secret keys are typically used. In this paper, however, we do not use any secret keys for the SPNs because we will use the SPNs only to amplify the errors (rather than encrypting data as in cryptography). In the following, the error amplification effect of the SPNs is evaluated first by analysis assuming the ideal S-boxes and then by simulation using the real S-boxes.
In [29] , assuming the ideal S-boxes satisfying the SAC, the output error probability of the SPN was analyzed. Let K denote the number of input and output bits of the SPN. Let W r denote the random variable representing the number of bit errors after round r . Let B denote the number of input and output bits of each S-box. Assuming K is an integer multiples of B, we use J = K B to denote the number of S-boxes connected in parallel for each round. Let L r denote the random variable representing the number of S-boxes in round r affected by the bit errors. The distribution of W r is given by [29] 
BER at the output of the SPN composed of 8 × 8 theoretical S-boxes satisfying SAC, when only one input bit is in error out of total K input bits. The number J of S-boxes for each round is given by K 8 . The BER is analytically obtained by (6)- (8) .
Using q W r (w r ), the BER at the output of the SPN after r rounds can be determined as follows
In order to actually determine the BER using (7), the initial distribution q W 0 (w 0 ) must be explicitly given. To determine q W 0 (w 0 ), however, one needs to know the exact statistics of the bit error patterns at the input of the SPN (or, at the output of the decoder), which appears not possible. Hence, for analytical tractability, we consider the BER upper bound for Bob and the BER lower bound for Eve, which will be derived in the next section. In particular, to derive Eve's BER lower bound, we will consider the case that there is only a single input bit error, in which the initial distribution is given by
In Fig. 1 , the output BER analytically obtained by (6)-(8) is plotted for different sizes of SPNs with B = 8. The number J of S-boxes for each round is given by K 8 . One can see that, with a small number r of rounds, the BER is generally smaller for larger K , because it takes more rounds for the case of large K to spread the errors over the entire bits. However, for larger number of rounds (e.g., r ≥ 4), the BER is essentially 0.5 regardless of the size K of the SPN.
Above analysis and numerical results are based on the ideal S-boxes satisfying the SAC. We now evaluate the BER of an actual SPN composed of the real S-boxes. In this paper, as an example, we use the actual 8 × 8 S-boxes adopted for the AES [26, Fig. 3 .8], which is known to have a good avalanche property [30] . For the case of single input bit error, Fig. 2 shows the output BER obtained by simulations. One can see that, by increasing the number r of rounds, it is possible to make the output BER close to 0.5. This means that the input error can be effectively amplified by the actual SPNs.
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION IN THE BER SENSE FOR FINITE BLOCKLENGTHS

A. Combining Strong Converse and Cryptographic Confusion and Diffusion
When C e < R < C b , by increasing the blocklength n, it is possible to make Bob's block error probability arbitrarily small and Eve's block error probability arbitrarily large. Ensuring the small block error probability at Bob means reliable communication. However, ensuring the high block error probability at Eve does not necessarily mean that the transmission is secure, because a block error event simply means that there is at least a single bit error in the block. As an example, one may consider the case where only a single bit within a codeword is always in error whenever the codeword is decoded. In this case, the block error probability is one; however, all other bits except the one are decoded by Eve, which means the communication is never secure. 4 In order to address this issue, a method to induce a high BER at Eve is discussed.
The block diagram of the proposed scheme is presented in Fig. 3 . Using an inverse SPN, Alice encrypts message M of 4 A practical example is that Alice is a bank sending a text message that is composed of the bits representing her 100 customers' very confidential information (such as their names, bank account numbers, etc). If the last 10% of the bits are correctly decoded by Eve, this means that last 10 customers' personal information is disclosed. Only when 0% of the bits are correctly decode by Eve, one can say that the communication is secure. If a very specific (and very unusual) coding scheme which maps the information bits to the coded bits is used, ensuring the high block error probability might ensure a strong security. However, there is no guarantee that such very specific (and unusual) coding is good for Bob, and thus, such coding should not be used in practice. In our work, we assume that any existing high performance (capacity approaching or capacity achieving) coding can be used. In this case, the high BER should be used for a strong security, not the high block error probability. length K bits into bit sequence S K of the same length, which is then encoded into a codeword X n of length n symbols. From the perspective of Eve, the best (or most efficient) way to decode the secret message is to reverse the processing of Alice. Otherwise, the complexity should be even higher. Thus, Eve's decoder structure is supposed to be the reversed version of Alice's one. That is, Eve decodes the received codeword Y n e into bit sequenceŜ K e , which is then decrypted intoM e by the SPN. For the very same reason, Bob's decoder structure is also supposed to be the reversed version of Alice's one. That is, Bob decodes the received codeword Y n b into bit sequencê S K b , which is then decrypted intoM b by the SPN. At the receiver side (Bob or Eve), if no block decoding error occurs at the channel decoder, there is no bit error at the input of the SPN, and thus, no output bit errors. On the other hand, when a block decoding error occurs at the channel decoder, there is at least one bit error at the input of the SPN and the input error(s) will be amplified by the SPN.
Note that even ensuring a high BER may not be secure enough on its own, if there exist any statistical correlations between the input bit errors and the output bit errors and/or if there exist any correlations among the output bit errors. These issues can be effectively addressed by using the SPNs composed of the S-boxes, but not by the linear scramblers. As discussed before, a fundamental design criterion of S-boxes is the SAC [28] . Furthermore, the concept of the SAC is further strengthened by ensuring the higher order/higher degree SAC [31] - [33] : (i ) the SAC of degree l is satisfied if, whenever l input bits are complemented at the same time, each of the output bits changes with a 50% probability; (ii) the SAC of order k is satisfied if the SAC is satisfied with fixing k input bits to arbitrary and fixed values. Another fundamental design criterion of the S-boxes is the BIC [28] , [34] - [36] . The BIC means that, when any input bit i is inverted, any two output bits j and k should change independently, for all i , j , and k. For the actual S-boxes, it was experimentally demonstrated the BIC criterion is reasonably well satisfied [34] , [35] . Overall, in order to amplify the errors, the cryptographic ciphers such as the SPNs should be used (rather than linear scrambles) for stronger security.
In our proposed scheme, the computing power required for Eve to decode the secret data is in general prohibitively high and it can be essentially considered to be infeasible. Eve can know if the decoding of the codeword has been successful or not (by using the CRC). But, she does not know the exact information bit error pattern (or the exact number of uncorrected information bit errors) in the decoded message. Therefore, to decipher the data, the number of times Eve should run the SPN is K 1 + K 2 + · · · + K K = 2 K − 1, where K is the number of information bits in each codeword. In general, 2 K −1 is a prohibitively large number. For example, if we consider a code of length n = 10 3 and rate K n = 0.5, the complexity is about 2 500 10 150 , which is never possible to test. 5 However, when K is very small, the complexity might not be high enough. For example, when n = 10 3 and rate K n = 0.01, the complexity is only about 2 10 10 3 , which may not be secure enough. In order to address this issue, in our scheme, K should be maintained to be larger than a certain value, say, K ≥ K min = 300. In this case, the minimum guaranteed complexity is about 2 300 10 90 , which should be secure enough. Given a desired code rate K n , the codelength n can be adjusted (or increased) to ensure the minimum value K min .
B. BER Bounds Analysis
The BER P BER (R|C ) for a code C at the output of the SPN is given by
where P err (R|C ) denotes the block error probability at the output of the decoder and P SPN BER (r, K ) block error is the BER at the output of the SPN given a block error. In order to (analytically or numerically) compute the BER P SPN BER (r, K ) block error , the initial error distribution q W 0 (w 0 ) must be determined from the condition that there was a block error, which means that there was at least a single bit error at the input of the SPN. However, the exact number of bit errors within a block is random and the exact distribution of the number of bit errors is unknown. Furthermore, the exact block error probabilities, P err (R|C ), for Bob and Eve are unknown. In the following, therefore, we consider their bounds: for Bob, an upper bound of the ensemble average E[P err (R|C )] is used; and for Eve, a lower bound of P err (R|C ) is used.
For Bob, using the ensemble average block error probability bound P b err (R) ≤ P b,U err (R,ρ,qρ (x)) in (1) and noting that P SPN BER (r, K ) block error is upper bounded by 0.5, 6 the ensemble average BER of Bob is upper bounded as follows:
For Eve, using P e err (R|C ) ≥ P e,L err (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)), ∀C in (4) and P SPN BER (r, K ) ≥ P SPN,L BER (r, K ), the BER is lower bounded as follows: P e BER (R|C ) ≥ P SPN,L BER (r, K )P e,L err (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)), ∀C =: P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)) 5 To have a sense that 10 150 is a very large number, one may compare it with the number of atoms in the observable universe, which is known to be somewhere between 10 78 and 10 80 . 6 Although 0.5 is a trivial BER upper bound, it is actually tight in our case because the output BER P SPN BER (r, K ) block error of SPN given a block error is (very) close to 0.5 as long as r is large enough, e.g., r ≥ 10, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2. where P SPN,L BER (r, K ) is given by
That is, P SPN,L BER (r, K ) denotes the BER at the output of the SPN when there is only a single input bit error (rather than at least one input bit error), and P SPN,L BER (r, K ) can be obtained by analysis using (8) or by simulation as in Section II.C.
In general, the two optimal distributions providing the tightest upper BER bound and the valid lower BER bound are not necessarily the same and they are dependent on optimal ρ andρ , i.e.,qρ(x) =q ρ (x). For the symmetric DMCs and BI-AWGN channels, however, they are the same and independent ofρ andρ ; both are given by the equi-probable distribution.
Lemma 1: For the symmetric DMCs (including the BSCs and BECs) and the BI-AWGN channels, we havȇ
where q equ (x) is the equi-probable distribution.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In our scheme, two bounds are imposed at the same time given a single transmitter (Alice). Therefore, it is important to ensure the existence of such code satisfying both bounds. That is, it must be ensured that at least a code exists for which Bob's BER (not Bob's ensemble average BER) is upper bounded by P b,U BER (R,ρ,qρ(x)) and Eve's BER is lower bounded by P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)) at the same time. Such existence is shown in the following.
Lemma 2: When C e < R < C b and a priori probabilities are the same, ∃C such that P b BER (R|C ) ≤ P b,U BER (R,ρ,qρ(x)) and P e BER (R|C ) ≥ P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)). Proof: When R < C b , there exists at least one code for which Bob's BER is upper bounded by P b,U BER (R,ρ,qρ(x)). Furthermore, when R > C e and a priori probabilities are the same, Eve's BER for any code is lower bounded by P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)). Therefore, there must exist a code satisfying both.
For the asymptotic case of infinite blocklengths, we have lim n→∞ P b,U err (R,ρ,qρ(x)) = 0 and lim n→∞ P e,L err (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)) = 1 when C e < R < C b . Thus, Bob's BER upper bound and Eve's BER lower bound are asymptotically given by
Recall that P SPN,L BER (r, K ) can be made very close to 0.5 by increasing the number r of rounds, as demonstrated in Figs. 1 and 2 .
C. Rate Upper and Lower Bounds for Finite Blocklengths
In practice, the blocklength n is finite, and thus, it is not possible to achieve P b,U BER (R,ρ,qρ(x)) → 0 when R < C b .
In this paper, therefore, Bob's BER upper bound is constrained to be smaller than a BER threshold, 0 < P b,Th BER ≤ 0.5, as follows:
This condition will be referred to as the reliability condition. To adjust P b,Th BER , it is possible to use a block error probability threshold 0 < P b,Th err ≤ 1, which is related to P b,Th BER as follows: P b,Th BER = 0.5P b,Th err . For a high reliability, P b,Th err should be set small (e.g., 10 −6 ). Similar to Bob's case, with a finite blocklength n, it is not possible to achieve P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)) → P SPN,L BER (r, K ) for Eve when R > C e . Therefore, Eve's BER lower bound is constrained to be larger than a BER threshold, P e,Th BER with 0 ≤ P e,Th BER < P SPN,L BER (r, K ) as follows: P e BER (R|C ) ≥ P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)) ≥ P e,Th BER , ∀C . (11) This condition will be referred to as the security condition. To adjust P e,Th BER , it is possible to use a block error probability threshold 0 ≤ P e,Th err < 1, which is related to P e,Th BER as follows: P e,Th BER = P SPN,L BER (r, K )P e,Th err . For a high security, P e,Th err should be set large (e.g., 0.999999). When the reliability condition is imposed, the highest possible rate is lower than C b . Also, when the security condition is imposed, the lowest possible rate is higher than C e . In the following, the rate differences are defined.
Definition 1: The rate margin from above is defined by R b := C b − R sup and the rate margin from below is defined by R e := R inf −C e , where the highest allowable transmission rate R sup and the lowest allowable transmission rate R inf are determined by
In the following theorem, R b and R e are analyzed.
For P e,Th err = 0, we have R e = 0. For 0 < P e,Th err < 1, we have
where optimalρ is determined byρ = arg max −1<ρ <0 E e 0 (ρ ,q ρ (x)) − ρ R inf . As n → ∞, both rate margins tend to zero: R b → 0 and R e → 0.
Proof: See Appendix B. From Theorem 1, one can see that, when 0 < P b,Th err < 1, the rate margin from above R b is always positive, inversely proportional to n andρ, and logarithmically inversely proportional to P b,Th err . Thus, to reduce R b , it appears that increasing the blocklength would be more effective than increasing P b,Th err . A similar observation can be made for the rate margin from below R e .
Let R = R sup − R inf denote the rate interval in which the actual transmit rate R can be chosen. When R > 0, it is possible for Alice to transmit the data reliably and securely satisfying (10) and (11) . However, if R < 0, it is not possible to choose a rate R satisfying both conditions at the same time, and the data transmission is suspended. Letting C = C b −C e denote the secrecy capacity, the difference between capacity and rate intervals is given by and P e,L BER (R,ρ ,q ρ (x)) ≥ P e,Th BER as in Theorem 1. Thus, the results of Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows: There exists at least one code whose rate margins from above and below are not larger than R b and R e , respectively.
D. Security Gap
For some specific codes over the BI-AWGN channels, the security gap was defined as the difference between Bob's received signal to noise ratio (SNR) required to ensure Bob's BER smaller than a threshold and Eve's received SNR required to ensure Eve's BER larger than a threshold [20] , [21] . In general, the smaller the security gap, the suitable and more efficient the code for secure communications based on the BER security measure. By simulating specifically designed punctured-LDPC codes for the BI-AWGN channels, the authors of [20] numerically obtained the security gap for their own codes. Similarly, in [21] , the security gap was numerically obtained by simulating some specific BCH and LDPC codes combined with scrambling/descrambling for the BI-AWGN channels. In this subsection, a fundamental limit of the security gap for any code with any finite blocklength is studied for our proposed secure communications of combining strong converse and error amplification.
1) Gaussian Input AWGN Channels: Consider the Gaussian channel, where the received signals at Bob and Eve are given by Y b,i = X i + η b,i and Y e,i = X i + η e,i , i = 1, · · · , n where η b,i ∼ CN (0, σ 2 b ) and η e,i ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e ) represent the AWGNs at Bob and Eve, respectively. The transmitted signal X i is normalized such that E[|X i | 2 ] = 1. Then the SNRs at Bob and Eve, respectively, are given by
. We now define the security gap as follows.
Definition 2: For the AWGN channels, the security gap S is defined by S := 10 log 10 γ inf b γ sup e (14) where the lowest SNR γ inf b for Bob and the highest SNR γ sup e for Eve are determined by 
In the above equations, γ 0 = C −1 AWGN (R), where C AWGN (γ ) = ln(1 + γ ) denotes the capacity of the AWGN channels.
In order to determine Bob's tightest ensemble average BER upper bound and Eve's valid BER lower bound for any code, the input distributions q(x) and q (x) must be first optimized by maximizing E b 0 (ρ, q(x), γ b ) and minimizing E e 0 (ρ , q (x), γ e ), respectively. Such optimizations are generally challenging, because the optimizations should be numerically performed and the optimal distributions depend on γ b , γ e , and R (throughρ andρ ). In this subsection, for analytical tractability, we choose the input distributions as CN (0, 1) , which is denoted by q CN (x). 7 With q CN (x), the upper bound of Bob's ensemble average BER and the lower bound of Eve's BER can be determined in closed-form, which are easy to evaluate. In particular, the obtained BER expressions are the explicit functions of the codelength n, the reliability condition P b,Th err , the security condition P e,Th err . Furthermore, this analysis will give us useful insights into the security gap, which will be discussed in the following. Because we consider the average power constraint E[|X i | 2 ] = 1, we use the continuous version of the standard form (i.e., − ln y x q(x) f (y|x) 1/(1+ρ) 1+ρ ) of the error exponent along with q CN (x). 8 Then the following closed-form expressions of the BER bounds are obtained: 7 In the literature, the Gaussian input is often used to determine the error exponent for analytical tractability and to obtain useful insights [38] - [40] . 8 It is possible to consider a more strict power constraint that the instantaneous power of ever y codeword in the ensemble satisfies the power constraint as in [24, eq. (7.3.11) ]. In this case, the modified form of error exponents should be used such as [24, eq. (7.4.33) ]. When n → ∞, the average power constraint becomes the same as the instantaneous power constraint for all codewords, based on the law of large numbers. Thus, when the codelength is reasonably long, for most of the codewords in the ensemble, the instantaneous power constraint can be satisfied only by ensuring the average power constraint.
where
To determine S for the AWGN channels, the highest SNR γ inf b and the lowest SNR γ sup e are first obtained in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The solutions to (15) and (16) with qρ(x) =q ρ (x) = q CN (x) are given by 
The optimal solutionρ to (21) 
Proof: See Appendix C. From the lemma, we immediately have the following result. 
whereρ andρ are given by (21) and (22) , respectively.
Note that (24) is derived under the assumptions of the continuous Gaussian input and the lookup table decoding requiring an exponential complexity. Thus, it serves as a benchmark for the actual security gap results, which are obtained by simulating actual codes such as LDPC codes. In particular, (24) is given in a very useful form, i.e., a closedform function of the codelength, Bob's BER requirement, Eve's BER requirement, and the transmission rate. Also, if one takes a high SNR approximation assuming γ b 1 and γ e 1, it is easier to obtain useful insights into the security gap. When γ b 1 and γ e 1, the upper bound of Bob's ensemble average BER and the lower bound of Eve's BER can be approximated as follows:
From the approximate BER bounds, the security gap is obtained as follows:
S − 1 nρ 10 log 10 P b,Th err + 1 nρ 10 log 10 1 − P e,Th err + 10 log 10 1 +ρ 1 +ρ
where 0 <ρ ≤ 1 and −1 <ρ < 0. From this expression, one can easily see that the security gap is inversely proportional to n and logarithmically inversely proportional to P b,Th err and (1 − P e,Th err ). Note that it is incorrect to interpret (25) to mean that, because R does not explicitly appear in (25) , S becomes independent of R in the high SNR. Since both ρ andρ depend on R, the security gap S still depends on R in the high SNR.
2) M-Ary Input AWGN Channels: For the one-dimensional or two-dimensional M-ary discrete input AWGN channels with the equi-probable inputs, the security gap S can be obtained by (14) , (15) , and (16) by using γ 0 = C −1 MI−AWGN (R), where C MI−AWGN (γ ) denotes the capacity of the equi-probable M-ary input AWGN channel given in [37, eq. (1.20) ]. Also, Bob's ensemble average BER upper bound and Eve's BER lower bound can be obtained in a similar way as in the Gaussian input case. As an example, for the BI-AWGN, the bounds are given by (26) and (27) on the bottom of this page, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and −1 < ρ ≤ 0 are optimized to obtain the tightest bounds. Unlike the Gaussian input case, it is difficult to analytically obtain the security gap S for the M-ary input case because the BER bounds are not given in closed-form. Thus, S should be obtained numerically.
3) BSCs and BECs: Although the security gap was originally considered only for the AWGN channels in the literature, the concept can be extended to other channels such as BSCs and BECs. Let ε b denote the crossover and erasure probabilities for the BSC and BEC, respectively, for Bob. Let ε e denote the crossover and erasure probabilities for the BSC and BEC, respectively, for Eve. It is assumed that 0 ≤ ε b < ε e ≤ 0.5 for BSCs, and 0 ≤ ε b < ε e ≤ 1 for BECs. Given R, the security gap can be defined as the difference between the two probabilities as follows:
Definition 3: For the BSCs and BECs, the security gap is defined as follows 9 :
where ε sup b and ε inf e are determined by
ε e subject to P e,L BER (R,ρ , q equ (x), ε e ) ≥ P e,Th BER .
In these equations, ε 0 = C −1 BSC (R) for the BSCs and ε 0 = C −1 BEC (R) for the BECs, where C BSC (ε) and C BEC (ε) are the capacities of the BSCs and BECs, respectively.
For the BSCs, the BER bounds are given by (29) and (30) on the bottom of this page. For the BECs, the BER bounds are 9 Alternatively, it is possible to define it as the ratio of the probabili-
. However, defining based on the probability difference appears more reasonable. With this definition, the security gap is given in 0 ≤ S ≤ 0.5 for the BSCs and in 0 ≤ S ≤ 1 for the BECs. Thus, S is in the same range of the error probability for both BSCs and BECs. Also, S can be interpreted as the required probability difference, of which measure is still the probability.
P e,L BER (R, ρ , q equ (x), γ e ) = P SPN,L BER (r, K ) given by
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results for the proposed secure communication method. First, we present the numerical results of the rate margins R b and R e obtained in Theorem 1. Different reliability and security requirements are tested by considering P b,Th err ∈ {1, 10 −2 , 10 −4 , 10 −6 } and P e,Th err ∈ {0, 1 − 10 −2 , 1 − 10 −4 , 1 − 10 −6 }. Recall that Bob's BER upper bound threshold is given by P b,Th BER = 0.5P b,Th err and Eve's BER lower bound threshold is given by P e,Th BER = P SPN,L BER (r, K )P e,Th err . Fig. 4 shows R b and R e for the BSC with ε b = 0.01 and ε e = 0.3 for different blocklengths 10 2 ≤ n ≤ 10 6 . Also, Fig. 5 shows R b and R e for the BI-AWGN with γ b = 6 dB and γ e = −2 dB. One can see that as the blocklength n increases, R b and R e approach zero as expected in Theorem 1. With the weaker reliability and security requirements (i.e., larger P b,Th err and smaller P e,Th err ), the rate margins decrease.
Second, we present the numerical results for the security gap S obtained in Theorem 2. Fig. 6 shows the region where the condition of (23) is satisfied. It can be easily seen that the condition is satisfied for all practical cases, e.g., for all R with n > 10. Fig. 7 shows the security gaps for the BI-AWGN with R = 0.5 (nats/onedimensional-channel use) and the Gaussian-input (GI) AWGN with R = 1 (nats/two-dimensional-channel use). It can be seen that, for the same reliability and security conditions, the Gaussian input gives smaller security gap than the binary input. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORKS
In this paper, a secure data transmission method has been studied, where the security measure was given in terms of the BER at the eavesdropper. To realize such secure communication, the information-theoretic strong converse and the cryptographic error amplification have been combined. For finite blocklengths, the maximum and minimum allowable transmission rates and the security gap have been analyzed for any block codes over the DMCs. It has been observed that increasing the blocklength is very effective to reduce the rate loss and the security gap.
As discussed in the Introduction, the most common security measure is the equivocation or equivocation rate. As a further work, therefore, it is an interesting issue to establish the relationship between the high BER criterion and the equivocation criterion. Once the relationship is established, the next interesting problem can be developing the secure communication mechanism jointly using the BER and equivocation criteria as for security. If we assume a infinitely long codelength and if we do not consider the SPN amplifying the BER, Eve's BER can be lower bounded by the equation in [42, p. 207] . Unfortunately, we cannot use the bound for our work for the following reasons: (i ) The lower bound is not tight unless the transmission rate is extremely larger than Eve's capacity; (ii) The lower bound is valid only for the asymptotically long codelength, i.e., n → ∞; and (iii) The BER amplification by the SPN is not considered in the lower bound. It is a challenging problem to come up with a tight bound establishing the relationship between the BER and the equivocation for finite codelengths considering the SPN. To address the difficulty, the information theoretic results of the SPNs [43] - [45] might be utilized. In those works, the amount of information leaked by the cryptographic cyphers such as the S-boxes is analyzed. Utilizing those results might make relating the BER and equivocation criteria possible.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For the symmetric DMCs, it is well-known that E b 0 (ρ, q(x)), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, is maximized by the equi-probable distribution q equ (x) [41, Th. 7.2] . In the following, therefore, we will only show that E e 0 (ρ , q (x)), −1 < ρ ≤ 0, is also minimized by q equ (x).
The proof of this appendix is only for finite input and output alphabet sizes. But, the approach holds for the BI-AWGN channels. 10 For x ∈ {a 1 , · · · , a Q }, let us define α(y e , q ) as follows
where q = (q 1 , · · · , q Q ) = (q (x = a 1 ), · · · , q (x = a Q )). Because α(y e , q ) is linear in q and the function α 1+ρ is 10 Stating "we can partition the output space into intervals, subdivide the intervals more and more finely, and in the limit go to," Gallager extends the error exponent analysis of the discrete channels to the channels with infinite output alphabets [24, eq. (7.2.22) ]. In the same way, it is straightforward to extend our proof for the DMCs to the BI-AWGN channels. For M-ary input AWGN channels with unconstrained power (or with an amplitude constraint), the proof is still valid. But, with any power constraint, this proof is not applicable. concave in α, α(y, q) 1+ρ must be concave in q . Letting F(ρ , q ) = exp(−E e 0 (ρ , q )) = y e α(y e , q ), the function F(ρ , q ) is concave, because it is the sum of concave functions. Then F(ρ , q ) has a maximum for some q 0 .
Following [24, Th. 4.4.1] , the necessary and sufficient conditions that F(ρ , q ) is maximized at q 0 are where P b,U err (R, ρ,q ρ (x)) = 2P b,U BER (R, ρ,q ρ (x)). First, we consider the case of P b,Th err = 1. In this case, the constraint is always satisfied. Thus, R sup = sup 0≤R<C b R = C b . Second, we consider the case of 0 < P b,Th err < 1. For ρ = 0, we have P b,U err (R, ρ,q ρ (x)) = 1. However, we know that min 0≤ρ≤1 P b,U err (R, ρ,q ρ (x)) < 1 because max 0≤ρ≤1 {E b 0 (ρ,q ρ (x)) − ρ R} > 0 for R < C b . Thus, the optimalρ must be in 0 <ρ ≤ 1. That is, we haveρ
) is a monotonically decreasing function of R, the constraint must be satisfied with equality to maximize R: P b,U err (R sup , ρ,q ρ (x)) = P b,Th err . Thus, we have
where (b) is due to [16, eq.(34) ] and (c) is valid for any 0 < P b,Th err < 1. When n → ∞, we have R sup → C b from below, because the constraint becomes always satisfied by min 0≤ρ≤1 P b,U err (R, ρ,q ρ (x)) → 0 for any R < C b as n → ∞. Also, when n → ∞, we have R b → 0.
For R inf , the optimization problem is Th   err where P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)) = P e,L BER (R, ρ ,q ρ (x))/ P SPN,L BER (r, K ). We first consider the case of P e,Th err = 0. In this case, the constraint is always satisfied. Thus, R inf = inf R>C e R = C e . Second, consider the case of 0 < P e,Th err < 1. For ρ = 0, we have P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)) = 0. However, we know that max −1<ρ ≤0 P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)) > 0 because max −1<ρ ≤0 {E e 0 (ρ ,q (x)) − ρ R} > 0 for R > C e . Thus, the optimalρ must be in −1 <ρ < 0. That is, [16] , [25, Lemma 3.2.1]. Because P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)) is a monotonically decreasing function of R, the constraint must be satisfied with equality to minimize R: max −1<ρ ≤0 P e,L err (R inf , ρ ,q ρ (x)) = P e,Th err . Thus, we have > C e where (d) is due to [16, eq. (37) ] and (e) is valid for any 0 < P e,Th err < 1. When n → ∞, we have R inf → C e from above, because the constraint becomes always satisfied by min −1≤ρ ≤0 P e,L err (R, ρ ,q ρ (x)) → 1 for any R > C e as n → ∞. Thus, when n → ∞, we have R e → 0. Thus, γ sup e = sup 0≤γ e <γ 0 γ e = g e (ρ ), where optimal ρ is given byρ = arg max −1<ρ <0 γ e (ρ ). Finally, we consider the existence ofρ for open interval (−1, 0) . It is straightforward to show g e (ρ ) < γ 0 , lim ρ →−1 g e (ρ ) = 0, lim ρ →0− g e (ρ ) = −1, and lim ρ →−1 
